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Abstract
This paper describes a risk-based decision-making framework aimed at helping stakeholders 
of transport infrastructure to allocate (limited) resources eﬀectively, in order to mitigate the 
risk of a terrorist attack. The framework is used to model the security system, to consider a 
multitude of threat scenarios and to assess the decisions taken by the aggressors during the 
various stages of their attack. One of the key notions presented is the state of partial neu-
tralization, which reveals the losses that incur when the terrorist does not reach the primary 
target. A rail station of an airport is used as an example to demonstrate this framework.
Keywords: decision analysis, infrastructure security, probabilistic risk assessment, terrorism
1 Introduction
Civil The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the United States, inﬂicted heavy eco-
nomic losses and, numerous casualties, and the unprecedented eﬀects that followed these 
attacks have prompted policy makers and the public to make considerable eﬀorts towards 
the development of tools and approaches that estimate the risk of terrorism and aid with the 
implementation of security policies to reduce this risk. Furthermore, many potential attack 
scenarios have been proposed, and a large number of responses have been employed or 
advised [1]. A better comprehension of the actions of terrorists and the way they select cer-
tain targets of attack can aid in making the decisions and helping the security designers to 
allocate resources in the ﬁght against terrorism [2]. To face the challenge of terrorism, new 
analytical methods and new institutional arrangements must be elaborate, as per Making the 
Nation Safer, a report by the National Research Council [3]. Infrastructure is not an indepen-
dent system but rather is linked with other interdependent systems. A failure of the electrical 
power grid, for example, may aﬀect not only the energy sector but also in a cascading eﬀect 
may result in the collapse or severe disruption of transportation, telecommunications, public 
health, and banking and ﬁnancial systems of the country [4]. As the infrastructure is typically 
complex, and many issues can arise during the decision-making process, a risk manage-
ment framework is required to acknowledge all the parameters and uncertainties involved. 
Modelling risk and decision frameworks is appropriate for risk managers to derive the most 
suitable risk management measures [5]. Decision analysis as a subset of decision notions 
has been known of since 1963 (Howard and Matheson, 1989). Decision analysis recognises 
the three main features associated with all decisions: risks, beneﬁts, and costs. [4] showed 
the cost-beneﬁt analytical method has a wide range of applications (economics, ﬁnance, 
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probability, reliability etc.) The eﬀect of all these ﬁelds on decision boost is well deﬁned in 
the literature e.g., [6-8].Many methods have been devised in an attempt to model and assess 
the eﬃciency of counter-terrorism procedures. Some of these methods involve game-theo-
retic approaches which are used to model how intelligent attackers and defenders interact. 
Another set of methods is based on probabilistic risk assessment or PRA. PRA has been used 
to evaluate the risks associated with complex engineered entities and it recently started being 
used to assess terrorism risk. Moreover, PRA aids analysis and decision-maker to understand 
and describe the risks which is predict the probable consequences [9]. We presented [10] the 
framework for Managing Risk to deal with the risk analysis of situations where considering the 
state of partial neutralization of an attacker means the likely loss incurred in two scenarios 
can be estimated. In the ﬁrst scenario the attacker would be successful in the attack on the 
primary target while in the second one, in spite of failing to reach his primary target, they 
would still cause signiﬁcant damage to the infrastructure, threaten human life and aﬀect the 
ﬁnancial market. By breaking down a security system into individual layers, each with their 
own probabilities of an attacker being detected, engaged and neutralized an accurate model 
can be obtained. In addition, it is also assumed that the terrorists are rational and would try 
to maximize their chances of succeeding with the attack. In this paper, the security improve-
ment of an airport rail station will be used to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed and 
then deals with cost assessment for mitigating the total risk and cost-eﬀectiveness of the 
measures as a futur work.
2 Security risk analysis
The proposed framework breaks down the risk analysis into ﬁve main process components 
as shown in Fig. 1 below, where a separation of these main components reveals the key risk 
providers and the critical parameters that add to the uncertainty and form a framework for 
critical asset and processes for risk analysis [11-15]
Figure 1 Five main components of Security Risk Analysis
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2.1 Scenario identiﬁcation
During this ﬁrst step of the risk analysis the possible threat scenarios are determined. 
Worldwide since the 1990s, transportations systems have been targeted by terrorist attacks 
and this form of terrorist threats encompasses a wide range of potential attacks and more 
likely scenarios Fig. 2 [16].
Figure 2 The forms of terrorist threats in the public transportations
2.2 Consequence and criticality assessment
this assessment provides the estimated losses of a successful attack. In the area of counter-
terrorism the term loss has various meanings, such as damage to the environment, human 
casualties, impact on society, as well as economic losses either direct or indirect due to 
physical damage, interruptions of business and ﬁnancial market insecurity. These diﬀerent 
types of losses can be estimated using game-theoretic methods and modeling means such 
as event trees, fault trees and decision trees. In order to assess the eﬃciency of the various 
countermeasures, all these losses are converted to a single value which reﬂects the ﬁnancial 
loss by pricing casualties with insurance data.
2.3 Security vulnerability assessment
to understand and measure the impact of threats such as terrorism, the risk analysis and 
evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities are signiﬁcant methods and thus the output is very 
valuable information for decision makers to select the optimal countermeasures to manage 
threats. The third step of this risk analysis reveals the probability that a terrorist is successful 
in attacking their target with the condition that they initiated the attack. By combining this 
probability with the estimates of possible losses of key assets conditioned on the success 
of the attack, the main conditional expected loss associated with a scenario is revealed. The 
successful attack is based on the terrorist’s ability to defeat the security system. The defensi-
ve system comprises of a number of sequential steps: detection of the attacker, engagement 
upon detection and neutralization upon engagement (see Fig. 3). Each security zone is repre-
sented by speciﬁc components used for detection, engagement and neutralization. Therefore, 
in security zone i the probability that the defenders engage the attacker upon detection would 
be P
Di
 , the probability that the defenders engage the attacker in security zone i upon detection 
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in security zone j is represented by P
Ei|Dj
, and the probability that the attacker is neutralized in 
security zone i, after engagement in security zone j, is expressed by P
Ni|Dj
.
Figure 3 The defensive system process
The losses from an unsuccessful attack can be estimated by deﬁning two states of neutra-
lization. In the ﬁrst state the attacker is completely neutralized and is not able to inﬂict any 
damage to his surroundings. This state is labeled as neutralization of type 1 or full neutraliza-
tion and is denoted by N
i,1
 for the security zone i with a probability of P
Ni,1
. The second state of 
partial neutralization is used for the situations in which the terrorist is denied access to the 
following security zone but is not completely neutralized and therefore is still able to cause 
damage to the surroundings. The state of partial neutralization is labeled as type 2, denoted 
by N
i,2
, with a probability of P
Ni,2
. However, the defenders fail to neutralize the attacker, then 
the attacker can proceed to the next security zone. In this situation the probability is equal 
to 1 - ( P
Ni,1
 + P
Ni,2
 ).
Taking into account that all the means of detection are interconnected in all security zones, 
the attacker would only need to be detected in one security zone for full detection across all 
security zones. It is then safe to assume that either the engagement or the neutralization of 
the attacker failed in zone i if they are able to pass to the next security zone i+1 where they 
will be subsequently engaged. The probability associated with this situation would be P
Ei+1|Di
 
and an illustration is provided in Fig. 4 & Table 1, for a hypothetical asset with two security 
zones in series.
Figure 4 Hypothetical asset with two security zones
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Table 1  The Assumed defensive system process symbols.
The events Scenario Zone1 Zone2
Detection
(D1, D2) 
Detected D11 D21
NOT D12 ---
Engagement
(E1, E2) 
Engaged E11 E21
NOT --- ---
Neutralization
(N1, N2)
Completely N11 N21
Partially N12 N22
NOT --- N 3
Therefore, the probability that the attacker is completely neutralized, i.e., interdiction of type 
1 (m=1), or partially neutralized, i.e., interdiction of type 2 (m=2), is shown in Eq. (1).
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The probability of a successful attack is achieved by:
 
S KSAES
P P P  (2)
Where 	 
ES, ES,ESP P P  1 21  is the probability that the defenders fail to stop the attacker and 
P
KSA
 is the probability conditioned by a successful attack providing that the defenders fail to 
stop the attacker [10].
2.4 Treat likelihood assessment
one of the main steps in security risk analysis is creating a model of the decision making pro-
cess during which the attackers pick their best options and alternatives to execute the attack. 
Utility theory can be used to factor risk aversion into the decision process, and this section 
will infer utility functions that represent attacker proﬁles in threat Likelihood Assessment 
[17-20]. Their preferences can be illustrated by utility functions that order the alternative cho-
ices of the attackers by preference in a certain stage of the attack. [1] Terrorists maximize 
the expected utility by choosing the appropriate attack proﬁle, threat scenario and asset to 
attack. The attacker’s utility function focuses on the maximum loss brought to the defenders, 
reducing their loss in the case of an unsuccessful attack and minimizing the cost of execution.
2.5 Life-cycle cost assessment
for the decision maker, it is essential to have analytical tools comparing and assessing risk 
against the costs. If the loss feature is in units other than cost (such as fatalities) and for 
assessing the costs and beneﬁts of counter-terrorism (CT), which denote protective measures 
for infrastructure, it is concluded that to deﬁne cost-eﬀectiveness the incremental cost-eﬀec-
tiveness ratio (CER) is used, as explained [8]:
 
cost spent on CT measure
losses avoid by CT measure
 (3)
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3 Conclusion
Security risk assessment aims to identify the most eﬃcient risk reduction options while ta-
king into account a limited budget. Generally, these options include the reduction of the 
probability of attacks and the potential losses following an attack. The eﬃciency is obtained 
by observing the reduction in total loss upon the application of the mitigation method while 
taking into account the cost of implementation.It is clear that a terrorist attack on one part of 
the infrastructure such as railway stations in the airports could cause a serious loss of lives 
and deterioration of the economy and infrastructure as a whole. Thus, management of risk to 
vital infrastructure is crucial for prosperity in our modern society. Terrorist attacks have been 
determined as a major source of risk and stakeholders and decision makers have made consi-
derable eﬀorts to develop tools that aid with risk mitigation.The diﬀerence between a natural 
risk and a terrorism risk is that the latter is planned by an intelligent aggressor and therefore 
it cannot be modeled using a random approach.To manage this risk, one must consider the 
human behaviour in identifying possible terrorist threats and their consequences. This paper 
presents a risk assessment of the framework presented by Shaﬁeezadeh, etc [10], which can 
be used to alleviate the risk of terrorist attacks on transport infrastructure, and it highlights 
the possibility of partial neutralization of the attacker.
References
[1] Paté-Cornell, E., Guikema, S.: “Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats: A systems analysis 
approach to setting priorities among countermeasures.,” Military Operations Research, vol. 7, no. 
4, pp. 5-23, 2002.
[2] Keeney, L.G.,  von Winterfeldt, D.: “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists,” Risk 
Analysis , vol. 30, no. 12, pp. 1803-1816, 2010.
[3] NRC, “Making the nation safer: the role of science and technology in countering terrorism,” The 
National Academies, Washington, DC, 2002.
[4] Garrick, B.J., Hall, E.J., Kilger, M., McDonald, C.J., O’Toole, T., Probst , S.P., Zebroski, E.L.: “Confronting 
the risk of terrorism :Making the right decision,” Reliability Engineering &System Safety, vol. 86, no. 
2, p. 129–176, 2004.
[5] Terje, A., Ortwin, R.: “The Role of Quantitative Risk Assessments for Characterizing Risk and 
Uncertainty and Delineating Appropriate Risk Management Options, with Special Emphasis on 
Terrorism Risk,” Society for Risk Analysis, vol. 29, no. 4, 2009.
[6] Jordaan, I.: Decisions Under Uncertainty: Probabilistic Analysis for Engineering Decisions, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[7] Bammer, G., Smithson, M.: Uncertainty and Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, London: Earthscan 
Publications, 2008.
[8] Stewart, G.M.: “Risk-informed decision support for assessing the costs and beneﬁts of counter-
terrorism protective measures for infrastructure,” International Journal of Infrastructure Protection, 
p. 2 9 – 4 0, 2010.
[9] Bier, V.M.: “Probabilistic risk analysis,” in Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, 
Mitigating, and Managing, Routledge, 2017, p. 192.
[10] Shaﬁeezadeh, A., Cha, E.J., Ellingwood, B.R.: “A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports 
from Terrorist Attack,” Risk Analysis,, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 292-306, 2015.
[11] Ayyub, B.M., McGill, W.L., Kaminskiy, M.: “Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis: An All- Hazards 
Framework,” Risk Analysis, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 790-800, 2007.
[12] Kaewunruen, S., Sussman, J.M., Matsumoto, A.: Grand Challenges in Transportation and Transit 
Systems. Front. Built Environ. 2:4, 2016. doi: 10.3389/fbuil.2016.00004
rail transport management 861
cetra 2018 – 5th International Conference on Road and Rail Infrastructure
[13] Kaewunruen, S.: Underpinning systems thinking inrailway engineering education, Australasian 
Journal of Engineering Education, in press, 2018. doi:10.1080/22054952.2018.1440481
[14] Lawrence, V., Kaewunruen, S., Bartoli, G., Baniotopoulos, C.: CFD simulation of passenger hazard risk 
at railway station platforms due to explosive air blasts, The 4th Thailand Rail Academic Symposium 
(TRAS 2017), Khao Yai, Pakchong, Nakhon Ratchasima, Thailand, August 31 – September 1, 2017. 
https://www.tras2017.com/.
[15] Sanchez, M.M.: “Security risk assessments in public transport networks,” Rail and Rapid Transit, 
vol. 225 Part F, 2010.
[16] Stewart, G.M., Mueller, J.: Aviation Security, Risk Assessment, and Risk Aversion for Public 
Decisionmaking, Policy Analysis and Management, 32 (2013) 3, pp. 615–633.
[17] Garcia, M.L.: “Chapter 2 – Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment,” in Eﬀective Physical Security, 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2017, pp. 23-53.
[18] Lawrence, V., Ngamkhanong, C., Kaewunruen, S.: An Investigation to Optimize the Layout of 
Protective Blast Barriers Using Finite Element Modelling, IOP Conference Series: Materials Science 
and Engineering, 280, 2017. doi: 10.1088/1757-899X/280/1/012035
[19] Kaewunruen, S., Pompeo, G., Bartoli, G.: Blast simulations and transient responses of long-span 
glass roof structures: A case of London’s railway station, Proceedings of the 25th UKACM Conference 
on Computational Mechanics, 12–13 April 2017, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, U.K. [https://
works.bepress.com/sakdirat_kaewunruen/83/]
[20] Sa’adin, S.L.B., Kaewunruen, S., Jaroszweski, D.: Operational readiness for climate change of Malaysia 
high-speed rail, Proc. Inst. Civ. Eng. Transp 169 (5), 308-320, 2016. doi: 10.1680/jtran.16.00031
